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This paper reviews the recent literature on exploitation. It distin-
guishes between three main species of exploitation theory: (a)
teleology‐based (including harm and mutual benefit) accounts, (b)
respect‐based (including mere means, force, rights, and fairness)
accounts, and (c) freedom‐based (including vulnerability and
domination) accounts. It then addresses the implications of each.1 | INTRODUCTION
Social interactions can be modeled and assessed in light of their effects on persons. These effects can be negative‐
sum, zero‐sum, or positive‐sum in the relevant metric—whether welfare, goods, capabilities, or some molecular
combination thereof. Call the relevant metric “widgets.” A negative‐sum interaction between persons involves a
negative sum total of widgets. Suppose A shoots B. The gun backfires, harming both A and B. This interaction is
negative‐sum. A zero‐sum interaction is one in which the sum of widgets is zero: My widget gain is your exact loss.
Finally, a positive‐sum interaction involves a surplus of widgets over and above the sum total of widgets enjoyed in
the noninteraction baseline.
Exploitation theory is largely concerned with the control and distribution of the surplus from positive‐sum trans-
actions. What makes such transactions particularly interesting is that they are sometimes mutually consensual and
beneficial. Indeed, this is the norm in the context of capitalist economic transactions. Human productive power,
however measured, has increased by more than 10‐fold over the past 200 years (Gordon, 2012). It is, therefore, unde-
niable that vast stretches of humanity have benefited from the growth of capitalist institutions. Yet this growth has
been concomitant with misery, degradation, and unfreedom.
An economic structure—feudal, capitalist, or socialist—is any set of power relations between agents that deter-
mines the control and distribution of the social surplus. Under capitalism, that control is vested in private individuals.
Suppose A owns a water‐producing well. If A's ownership of the well is fully enforced, B needs water, and B has no
independent access to water, then A has power over B, and B is vulnerable to A. Political economists have noted
how the enforcement of private property generates and exacerbates inequality (for recent examples, see Piketty,
2014, Stiglitz, 2012). Today's global economic surplus, they point out, is shared extremely unequally. The necessary
complement to this inequality is a series of practices that look like good candidates for exploitation: trafficking, guest
workers, sweatshops, commercial surrogacy, prostitution, financialization (the selling of high‐risk financial packages to
the poor), and imperialism. The sheer pervasiveness of these practices makes the study of exploitation topical.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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We need to know when exploitation1 of person by person obtains and what makes it wrong; we need a set of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for exploitation. This paper studies different accounts of these conditions.
I begin by nailing my colors on a platitude: A exploits B if and only if: (1) A benefits, (2) from a social relationship
with B, (3) by taking advantage of B. I discuss each clause of the platitude individually.
(1) A benefits.
(1) says that exploitation entails benefit to the exploiter relative to some nontransaction baseline. Without this
stipulation, it is impossible to distinguish between acts of exploitation and attempts to exploit. When exploitation
succeeds, we can be certain that A has benefited from her particular interaction with B, no matter how short‐lived or
trivial the benefit. A further distinction is relevant here. An exploitative act is to be distinguished from an act of exploi-
tation. Suppose A offers to rescue B (a drowning child), in return for a million dollars. This behavior—the acts and dispo-
sitions it expresses—is exploitative. But it may not result in an act of exploitation if A immediately rescinds the offer.2
A second necessary condition for exploitation is A's benefit
(2) from a social relationship with B.
For A to exploit B, A must benefit from meaningful causal interaction with B. A social relationship is any relation-
ship between agents representable as a relational predicate in a true and complete social science. Claims (1) and (2)
alone do not suffice for exploitation; if they did, then nearly every transaction would be exploitative. We need a
further condition, one that provides normative leverage; A must benefit from a social relationship with B
(3) by taking advantage of B.
When A exploits B, A takes advantage of B, that is, of B's whole person. A does that by taking advantage of certain
important features of B, features that are central to B's person, her life or well‐being. These might include B's ability to
work, to play, to give birth, or to have sex. Call these exploitation‐contents. Contrast exploitation‐enablers, that is,
features in virtue of which B is exploited. When a pimp exploits a prostitute, he takes advantage of her poverty (the
exploitation‐enabler) to exploit her sexual power (the exploitation‐object).3 And if sexual power is a sufficiently important
feature of one's person, or one she values, thepimpexploits not amere featureof the prostitute but theprostitute herself.
These formal strictures will not take us very far. In order to adequately distinguish between the exploitation of
features and the exploitation of persons, or between morally innocuous and morally objectionable advantage‐taking,
we need a normative theory. We must therefore attend to different ways in which (3) has been understood.
Consider
Pit—A finds B in a pit. A can get B out at little cost or difficulty. A offers to get B out but only if B agrees to pay a
million euros, or to sign a sweatshop contract with A. B signs the contract.
This transaction is paradigmatic of wrongful exploitation: if Pit does not instance exploitation, then nothing does.
The trick will be to figure out precisely what makes the transaction between A and B wrong. The rest of this paper
discusses different accounts of these wrongmakers.3 | CONCEPTUAL SPECIATION
The bare bones of the generic concept of exploitation in (1)–(3) have been fleshed out by three distinct classes of
theory: teleological theories, respect theories, and freedom theories. Teleological theories construe the wrongness
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the exploiter has undermined the possibilities for mutually advantageous trade, or has failed to reciprocate in kind.
Respect theories, by contrast, construe the wrongness of exploitation as injury to dignity or rights. That is, they take
(3) to entail that the exploitee has been forced to perform an act, has been used as a mere means, or has been treated
unfairly. Finally, freedom theories construe the wrongness of exploitation as injury to freedom or autonomy. That is,
they take (3) to entail that the exploitee's vulnerability has been improperly taken advantage of, that her autonomy has
been compromised, or that she has been dominated for the dominator's benefit.
I discuss these three species of theory separately, beginning with teleological views.4 | TELEOLOGICAL THEORIES
4.1 | Exploitation as harm
Harm is at the center of many liberal theories of exploitation. I here follow Feinberg (1987) in understanding harm as
setback to interests. If you punch me, then my well‐being drops relative to a counterfactual situation in which you do
not. I am therefore worse off relative to that baseline. On the harm view, A's advantage‐taking is interpreted as
(4.1) harm to B.
Clearly, (4.1) does not complete the set of sufficient conditions for exploitation. Suppose A and B participate in a
race, in which A wins and B loses. B has no complaint of exploitation. That is, it would be inapposite for B to say to A:
“you're exploiting me,” even if A is cheating.
Harm is not only insufficient for exploitation but also unnecessary.4 Suppose
A and B live in the commons, earning 5 widgets each (row a of Table 1). Upon reading Robert Nozick, A has an
idea. She will enclose the commons and hire B as a laborer on a sweatshop contract: B will work all day, producing
a surplus of 96 widgets. A will not work at all. Of this surplus, A will get 95 widgets and B will get 1 (row b). Intuitively,
such a contract, and the resulting distribution of the surplus, is exploitative. Indeed, the fact that there is normally a
third possibility in the feasible set, that of sharing the surplus equally (row c), heightens this sense of exploitation.
The options in the feasible set are
If A exploits B in (b), and if harm is defined relative to the pre‐enclosure baseline, then harm cannot be a necessary
condition for exploitation. For B is better off in (b) and is therefore not harmed relative to (a). She is harmed relative to
post‐enclosure equality (c), but that is not how harm is usually defined. When (b) is compared to (a), exploitation does
not involve harm. Feinberg (1987) infers that exploitation is a non‐harm‐based “free‐floating evil.”5
Some philosophers believe that harm per se says nothing about wrongdoing. A may harm B with B's consent, as
when B engages in some form of masochism. What matters, they say, is nonvoluntary or nonconsensual harm.
Partisans of this view claim that harm to others just is nonconsensual harm, and nonconsensual harm is pro tanto
wrongful. This sort of harm, they say, completes the definition of exploitation (see, e.g., Benn, 1988).
According to the consent view, A exploits B if and only if A benefits:
(4.2) by causing nonconsensual harm to B.TABLE 1 Exploitation and harm
(payoffA, payoffB)
(a) pre‐enclosure distribution (5, 5)
(b) post‐enclosure with sweatshop contract (100, 6)
(c) post‐enclosure equality (53, 53)
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forces you to sign a piece of paper. Other forms of consent are irrational, as when a self‐loving person signs her
own death sentence under the influence of drugs. Yet other forms of consent are uninformed, as when you sign a
piece of paper which, unbeknownst to you, will result in your execution. The idea of consent we are after is free, ratio-
nal, and informed consent.
Does this redefinition of consent furnish a sufficient condition for exploitation? No. Suppose someone
punches you in the street and runs away with your purse. The interaction meets the conjunction of conditions
(1), (2), and (4.2) but does not count as exploitation. Theft and exploitation are distinct things. Robbery, which is
a specific kind of theft, is also not exploitative. If the robber puts a gun on your head, threatening to shoot you
unless you hand over your purse, and you do, she is still not exploiting you. Robbers rob. But they do not, just
by dint of robbing, exploit.
Is nonconsensual harm a necessary condition for exploitation? It is not. The enclosure example shows that the
social surplus can be shared extremely unequally even if all parties benefit and even if all parties consent to (b). But
(b) still seems exploitative. Suppose Charlotte is deeply in love with Werther, whom she leaves wholly indifferent.
Charlotte gives away all of her livelihood to impress Werther, who is flattered and amused by her courtship. Werther
takes Charlotte's gifts without reciprocating and without discouraging her advances. In this instance of unrequited
love, Werther and Charlotte effectively agree that Charlotte be impoverished and Werther be enriched, in the
relevant metric. Werther exploits Charlotte. If this is correct, then Charlotte is exploited through her own free, ratio-
nal, and informed consent.6 In light of these difficulties, why not just shift the baseline for harm, from (a) to (c)? The
only principled way to do this is by appeal to a harm‐independent criterion, such as fairness, rights, or domination.
Nonconsensual harm does not, therefore, furnish a necessary condition for exploitation. More generally, it is
unlikely that failures of consent or voluntariness will help us understand exploitation. For the latter is objective, in
the sense that it has to do with the mind‐independent nature of the social relation between transactors and the nature
of the reasons such a relation entails. Of course, the mental state of each party may help determine the rate at which
A is willing to buy and B is willing to sell. Any transaction that falls within the margin of agreement—a price lower than
the buyer's reservation price but greater than the seller's—will normally be mutually consensual and mutually benefi-
cial. It does not follow, however, that it is not exploitative.
4.2 | Exploitation as failure of reciprocity
Another popular teleological account of exploitation appeals to some account of nonreciprocity. Reciprocity is a
slippery concept, and care must be taken defining it. A possible construal of (3) along these lines claims that A benefits
(4.3) by receiving something from B, without giving an equivalent in return.
Suppose A gets B to pay for all the drinks, and A never does. Then, their transaction satisfies (4.3). Likewise, when
A gets B to work for A, or to give birth for A, or to have sex with A, without giving anything back, A benefits at B's
expense. This leaves it open that B also benefits from the transaction. Note that the nonreciprocity view is not distrib-
utive: A given transaction may satisfy (4.3) and therefore count as exploitative independently of background
distribution.
What is the metric of benefit, on the nonreciprocity view? One of Marxism's enduring legacies to exploitation
theory consists in a set of definitions based on the unequal exchange of labor (UE). On these definitions, A exploits
B if and only if A extracts unreciprocated labor flow from B. Let Li
G stand for the amount of labor time agent i expends,
or gives, in production, and let Li
R stand for the amount of labor i receives through her consumption bundle.7 Then, UE
obtains between A and B if and only if
UEð Þ LRA>LGA and LRB<LGB :
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capitalist” or performing “unpaid labor” are central to his charge of exploitation. According to Marx, a part of the
working day is spent by workers working on their own subsistence, which they receive in wages. Suppose there
is a correspondence between the amount of time the worker spends working and the wages she receives. The
worker's wage is worth, say, 6 hours of labor time. The capitalist is not, however, going to let the worker walk away
with only 6 hours of labor time spent. If she did, there would be no profit, and no profit means no livelihood for the
capitalist. So the capitalist writes it into the worker's contract that she will work for 12 hours a day. The worker's
wage is worth 6 hours' labor, but she works for 12 hours.8 She therefore works gratis for the capitalist for 6 hours
a day. Marx defines the rate of exploitation as the ratio of unpaid (6 hours) to paid labor (6 hours) which is, in this
example, 100%.9
Now suppose that B producesT widgets in a rudimentary economy, whereT is total widget production. Suppose,
further, that A appropriates T − X, T > X > 0. This is an instance of unequal exchange. Unequal exchange obtains just
when there is an unreciprocated net transfer of labor time from one party to another. Some philosophers attribute to
Marx a “technical” notion of exploitation, according to which unequal exchange is not only a necessary but also a
sufficient condition for economic exploitation. It is doubtful that Marx held such a notion.10 But whatever Marx
thought, the content of the attribution is implausible. For gift‐giving implies unequal exchange. But no one thinks
(even systematic) gift‐giving exploitative. If one part of society freely11 decides to pass on a large part of whatever
use‐values it creates (with its own labor power) to another part of society, the resulting inequality in the consumption
of (surplus) labor need not be objectionable. Only a set of conditions over and above unequal exchange can establish
the presence of wrongful exploitation.
The advantage of UE‐type definitions is that they handily operationalize the concept of exploitation for social
science. Let S represent the difference between the amount of labor B gives and the amount she receives in her
consumption bundle. Beneficial advantage‐taking should then be interpreted as A benefiting
(4.4) by consuming a commodity bundle that embodies S.12
For much the same reasons as (UE), (4.4) does not complete the set of sufficient conditions for exploitation. So
when is unequal exchange exploitative? According to another teleological theory, unequal exchange is exploitative
when, and only when, it undermines possibilities for mutually advantageous trade.
Some philosophers (Gauthier, 1985; van Donselaar, 2009) claim that exploitation is a form of parasitism.
When nonworkers appropriate the fruit of workers' labor, the former exploit the latter. Such parasitism is
objectionable because it violates a putative requirement that agents not obstruct mutually beneficial transac-
tions, or transactions to which they have no transaction‐independent interests. As it stands, this theory is
untenable. Its major premise implies, implausibly, that sick and disabled nonworkers who benefit from redistri-
bution from the able‐bodied exploit the able‐bodied. This may be “parasitism,” in the technical sense of that
term, but it is not exploitation. Wolff (2010) criticizes the identification of parasitism with exploitation along
these lines.5 | RESPECT THEORIES
5.1 | Exploitation as forced nonreciprocation
Respect theorists hold that what completes the set of sufficient conditions for wrongful exploitation is the
treatment of others as mere means. Sample (2003) defends this account of exploitation. Sample's account has been
criticized for being too broad. Sample's account, the critic says, does not adequately distinguish between generically
disrespectful acts, such as theft, and idiosyncratically disrespectful acts, such as exploitation. The rest of this section
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complaints.
Many Marxists, and some liberals, maintain that exploitation constitutes treating others as mere means when and
because it involves forced, unpaid, surplus labor (see, e.g., Reiman, 1987, Peffer 1990). This re‐interpretation of the
nonreciprocity view has the exegetical advantage that it accords with much of what Marx says about the worker's
subjection to the “dull compulsion of economic relations.” It also resonates with widely held intuitions about the
putatively involuntary nature of exploitative interactions.
A brief conceptual detour is in order here. Force and coercion describe distinct events. To be forced to do F
means to lack a reasonable or acceptable alternative to F‐ing. Coercion involves force, in the relevant sense, when
A threatens B with a pistol: A forces B to give up her money. But the converse does not hold. The wind can force,
but it cannot coerce. Coercion personalizes force. This distinction sheds light on some central contentions in
economic and historical sociology.
Most social formations since antiquity involve surpluses, generated through social cooperation. In all such forma-
tions, it is typically a small part of society, one class, that has direct access to, and control over, these surpluses. In
ancient societies, for example, it is the slaveowners who appropriate and control the surplus created by slaves. There
are, at the same time, priests, politicians, and states, all of whom absorb a portion of the surplus. They are parasites of
the second order, so to speak. That is, they are parasitic on the class that exploits the direct producers.13
Under feudalism, feudal serfs produce the surplus, which the feudal lords appropriate and control. Serfs spend a
part of their time working for themselves and another part working for the feudal lord. Under both slavery and
feudalism, the mode of exploitation is direct coercion.14
Capitalism is like slavery and feudalism in that the surplus is appropriated and controlled by one class, namely,
capitalists. But, in contrast to both slavery and feudalism, the capitalist mode of exploitation does not involve surplus
extraction through coercion. No capitalist is permitted, by law, to coerce someone into working for her. And if the law
is properly enforced, as it is in most capitalist countries, then workers have formal control over their own labor power.
The existence of trade unions and welfare states, moreover, makes such control modally robust, that is, accessible
across possible worlds.
Some liberals and many Marxists nevertheless maintain that workers under capitalism are forced, by their
economic circumstances, to work for some capitalist (see, e.g., Cohen, 1988). It is the forced nature of the unequal
exchange between capitalists and workers that makes, or breaks, the case for (capitalist) exploitation. The claim is that,
under capitalism, B is forced to work for A in virtue of A's exclusive ownership of the means of production (Reiman,
1987). According to the force‐based view of exploitation, A benefits
(5.1) by getting B to perform forced, unreciprocated, surplus labor.
The force‐based view combines the UE definition in (4.4) with the systematic enforcement of propertylessness.
Unfortunately for those liberals and Marxists who affirm (5.1), this view provides neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for exploitation. I consider sufficiency first.
Societies with welfare states generally provide for the sick and disabled. Those welfare beneficiaries receive a net
transfer of labor time from able‐bodied taxpayers. The able‐bodied are, moreover, forced—because coerced by the
state—to engage in such net transfers. It follows, on any force‐inclusive definition of exploitation, that the welfare
state is a system in which the disabled poor exploit the able‐bodied rich. More precisely, consider
(5.1a) Exploitation is forced, unreciprocated exchange.
(5.1b) In any welfare system with progressive taxation, some rich able‐bodied people are forced to engage in
unreciprocated exchanges with poor disabled people.
Therefore,
(5.1c) the disabled poor exploit the able‐bodied rich.
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to affirm the force‐based definition (5.1a). That is, if (5.1b) is accepted, then either (5.1a) must be false, or liberals and
Marxists must rethink their commitment to equality. This might seem like to a boon to right‐libertarianism. It is not.
For right‐libertarians cannot affirm (5.1) either. Consider
(5.1a) Exploitation is forced, unreciprocated exchange.
(5.1d) Under capitalism, some poor able‐bodied people are forced15 to engage in unreciprocated exchanges with
rich able‐bodied people.
Therefore,
(5.1e) the able‐bodied rich exploit the able‐bodied poor.
Nozick (1974, pp. 253–64) realizes that, if claim (5.1a) is granted, then at least some proletarians, that is, able‐bod-
ied people who have nothing to sell but their labor power, will be exploited by capitalists. (5.1e) follows. Nozick balks
at this conclusion. He proceeds to disavow the major premise, (5.1a). I conclude that the force‐inclusive definition
constitutes a plague on all your houses: Marxist, liberal, or libertarian.
What about (5.1) as a necessary condition for exploitation? Consider a variation on an example due to Roemer
(1996):
Two Plots—A and B own different plots of land; A's more productive than B's and have identical cardinal utility
functions of the form u = ax, where x is the amount of widgets consumed. If they do nothing, then their land will
magically generate M for each, such that they both enjoy a perfectly decent level of utility aM. A offers B work in
A's land, which is much more productive than A's when worked on by human hands. If B accepts A's offer, he will
produce N widgets and consume slightly more than M, where N >> M (M is also sufficiently large to compensate
for the disutility of labor, if any). A will then consume N − M widgets, without working at all. B accepts the offer.
Roemer argues, plausibly, that this sort of interaction is exploitative. But B is forced neither by her economic
circumstances nor by third parties, to enter into it. Hence, force does not furnish a necessary condition for
exploitation.
Now, A is forced to F if and only if A Fs and A has no reasonable or acceptable alternatives to F‐ing. What counts
as a reasonable or acceptable alternative to F‐ing may vary with time, the general conditions of social development,
and so on. Yet Roemer's example seems to refute the force‐based definitions however “reasonable” or “acceptable”
are construed (see also Cohen, 1995; Elster, 1982). Roemer argues that what is wrong with theTwo Plots case is injus-
tice in the distribution of assets, broadly construed. Distributive injustice provides the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for wrongful exploitation. I discuss this view in the next section.5.2 | Exploitation as a violation of rights
A distinctive respect‐based explanation of the wrong of exploitation appeals to rights. One such view, due to Steiner
(1984), fixes the benefit counterfactual in terms of the absence of rights violations. That is, A exploits B if and only if A
benefits from a transaction with B, where the benefit is greater than what A would have obtained, had there been no
violation of B's rights. Suppose B is entitled, as a matter of right, to a life vest when drowning. A asks for a million to
throw in the life vest. Then, A is violating B's right. Thus, (3) is interpreted as A benefiting
(5.2) by violating B's rights.
(5.2) fails as a necessary condition for exploitation. There are cases where no rights violations occur, but A still
wrongfully exploits B. It seems not to matter, for example, how B found herself in the sea. All that matters is that
she is there, and that it is pro tanto wrongful to ask for money to help, at least as long as the would‐be rescuer
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rights against being helped nonexploitatively. Suppose A works all summer to procure the wherewithal for winter
survival, and B spends the whole summer singing—in full knowledge of winter exigencies. B thereby forfeits a right
to nonexploitative satisfaction of her winter needs. A's exorbitantly pricey offer of the lifesaver would not, in this case,
violate B's rights. There is, however, a lingering sense that A should not proffer that offer, precisely because doing so
constitutes exploitation. If this is correct, then rights‐forfeiture does not suffice to remove the stain of exploitation
from a relationship. In other words, exploitation and the absence of a rights violation are compatible.165.3 | Exploitation as distributive injustice
On the fairness view, exploitation obtains if and only if a transaction occurs against the background of unfairness. (3) is
here interpreted as A benefiting from distributive injustice. I propose to split the fairness account into two distinct
views: those referring to a fair price and those referring to a just distribution of assets. The fair price doctrine, I will
argue, is either false or collapses into the just distribution view.5.3.1 | Fair price
According to the fair price view, A takes advantage of B in any transaction where A benefits
(5.3) by offering B an unfair, excessively low price.
The idea of a fair price goes back to the Scholastics and formed a large part of the Ricardian socialists' critique of
capitalism (Hodgkin, 1825; Thompson, 1824). The Ricardian Socialists argued that, under capitalism, workers do not
get the full product of their labor, because of monopolies and market imperfections. Remove those imperfections,
and workers will receive their full entitlements. “The whole product of labor,” therefore, is equivalent to the fair price
for one's labor and the only such price.
A version of the fair price theory has been revived by Wertheimer (1996) and, more recently, by Valdman (2009).
Wertheimer claims that the answer to the fair price question turns on how close the actual price of a good is to a
hypothetical fair market price. That price, Wertheimer thinks, can sometimes helpfully be identified with the price
the good would fetch under perfect competition. Recall the Pit case. A finds B in a pit. A asks B for a million in return
for a rope, which costs $5. Her offer is eo ipso exploitative. Does Wertheimer's view capture what goes wrong in this
case? I will consider sufficiency first and necessity second.
Failure to pay the competitive market price is not sufficient for exploitation. A may be a very poor person asking
for an abnormally high price from B, whom A knows to be very rich. Intuitively, there does not seem to be something
exploitative about such offers. It is counterintuitive to maintain that were Senegal to erect tariff barriers to protect its
domestic industries by keeping domestic prices artificially above competitive levels, it would thereby be exploiting
Canadian tourists in Senegal.
Nor is failure to pay the competitive price necessary for exploitation. Consider a society where women are paid to
raise babies and where women are in very great abundance, while men are scarce. Women work arduous long hours,
whereas men work very little but earn high salaries, benefiting at the expense of women's labor. Those men seem to
exploit those women. Suppose there are no barriers to entry or competition in this world, such that all markets clear.
Prices do not seem to be unfair on Wertheimer's view. But there is exploitation here.17
An important variant of the fair price view is the marginal productivity theory, advocated by some neoclassical
economists (the idea originates from Clark, 1907). Those economists maintain that only competitive markets reward
“factors of production” (labor and capital) in proportion to their “contribution” to production.18 According to marginal
productivity theorists, the “contribution” to production is measured by a factor's marginal productivity, that is, the
amount of output created by the addition of an extra unit of that factor to production.
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fail to reward on the basis of marginal product. But what is the capitalist's contribution to production? Owning
stuff is not, in and of itself, a productive activity. Yet all that capitalists do, qua capitalists, is own. All productive
activity, in other words, is carried out by labor (including idea generation, management, organization, and so
forth). The pro‐capitalist response is that capitalists take risks with their money and therefore deserve a reward
for doing so.19
Perhaps the claim that capitalists deserve a reward for risk‐taking is ideological and therefore false. But we need
to ask a prior question: why would anyone deserve a reward for risk if what she risks with was not hers in the first
place (Arneson, 1981; Cohen, 1988)? I may create wonders by stealing your coat, or by renting it for profit, but I
do not thereby deserve what value I earn, or add to the coat. In other words, if capitalist private property is theft, then
no reward legitimately accrues to it. The fair price question therefore boils down to the question of the moral legiti-
macy of private property.5.3.2 | Just distribution
Advocates of the distribution view eschew talk of prices for talk of assets. They interpret (3) as A benefiting
(5.4) from enjoyment of an unfairly greater share of the benefits of social cooperation than B.
Among the most ardent defenders of (5.4) view are analytical Marxists, such as John Roemer and G. A. Cohen.
Roemer (1996) argues that exploitation complaints are, at best, morally derivative of claims about distributive
justice.20
According to Roemer, exploitation is the causal upshot of injustice in the distribution of alienable assets. Assets
are useful things that can be used to produce other useful things. Alienable assets are things like cars, machinery,
factories, and so forth. Inalienable assets are things like talents, capabilities, know‐how, and so forth. Roemer argues
that what is wrong with examples like Two Plots is injustice in the distribution of alienable assets. Thus, for any
coalition of agents A and its complement B, A exploits B only if A would be better off and B worse off were B to with-
draw with an equal share of society's alienable resources.
The Roemerian account is promising. It avoids the false negatives of (5.2) and the false positives of (5.1); it is
compatible with structural exploitation (see Zwolinski, 2012); and it provides a compelling explanation for why exploi-
tation is wrongful, when it is wrongful.
Now consider the Pit case. A finds B in a pit. A can get B out at little cost or difficulty. A offers to get B
out but only if B agrees to sign a sweatshop contract with A. A signs the contract. There is clearly an exploit-
ative interaction here. But notice that this judgment makes no reference to distributive background, or indeed
the justice of that background: What we have is a person, who is being offered bad terms, terms she has to
accept, in virtue of a vulnerability she has. If the justice of the distributive background does not matter, as
the example seems to illustrate, then distributive injustice cannot be a necessary condition for exploitation
(Vrousalis, 2013, 2014).
More generally, the following triad seems inconsistent:
i. exploitation is unfair advantage‐taking,
ii. some material inequalities are fair,
iii. exploitation can arise from any material inequality.
In light of the Pit case, (iii) seems compelling. Moreover, (ii) is a plausible assumption, entailed by nearly every
theory of justice, including Roemer's. Therefore (i), as defined by Roemer, must be rejected. If this is correct, then
exploitation is not tantamount to unfair advantage‐taking; indeed, there can be fair exploitings.
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6.1 | Exploitation as vulnerability‐instrumentalization
An alternative paradigm for understanding the wrong‐making features of exploitation is to look at how A and B relate to
each another, without immediate reference to distribution, rights, or treating as a means.What makes the Pit relationship
exploitative is the nature of the power relationship between A and B. According to the vulnerability view, A should not,
other things equal, enrich herself by taking advantage of B's vulnerability. (3) is therefore interpreted as A benefiting
(6.1) by taking advantage of B's vulnerable state.
(6.1) shifts the emphasis from distributive (in)justice to the instrumentalization of vulnerability. Here, exploitation
is vulnerability‐instrumentalization for self‐enrichment. Variants of this view have been defended by Goodin (1985)
and Wood (1995). More precisely, A exploits B if and only if A and B are embedded in a relationship in which A
instrumentalizes B's vulnerability to appropriate (the fruits of) B's labor. To exploit another is to somehow use her
dependence or vulnerability for your own benefit. This is degrading, since people have, as Kantians are fond of saying,
infinite worth and no price.
Return, as an illustration, to the Marxist complaint against capitalism. On that complaint, capitalists use workers
(by extracting labor time from them), to obtain a benefit (profit), by taking advantage of their vulnerability (their lack
of unhindered access to the means of production). The only controversial aspect of the demonstration that capitalists
exploit consists in showing that this use of workers is degrading, demeaning, or disrespectful. But all actual capitalists
are constrained, on pain of survival as capitalists, to treat their workers merely as sources of profit, just as they treat
their machinery. And if exploitation is instrumental use of others, then capitalists wrongfully exploit workers, and the
exploitation claim goes through without recourse to distributive‐justice premises (Wood, 1995).
The Achilles heel of this argument is that it is not sufficiently discriminating; it generates false positives. It seems
to imply, for example, that rich surgeons or gardeners who benefit from the lamentable state of my liver or my patio
necessarily exploit me (Arneson, 2016). This is reason enough to consider a more discriminating freedom‐based view.6.2 | Exploitation as domination
A freedom‐based alternative to the vulnerability view holds that the wrong‐making feature of wrongful exploitation is
abuse of power. (3), in other words, is to be interpreted as A benefiting
(6.2) from the domination of B.
On the domination view, A exploits B if A benefits from a transaction in which A dominates B. Exploitation, in other
words, is the dividend A extracts fromB's servitude. Variants of this view have been defended by Levine (1988), Goodin
(1985), and Vrousalis (2013, 2016). Now, if the domination view holds, then an unfair price (along the lines of (5.3)) is
neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation. Take necessity first. Suppose the fair price A offers is higher than B's
ability to pay, or high enough to leave B at A's mercy—in short, the offer, if accepted, dominates B. Then, the offer is
exploitative. Proposals can be fair and exploitative. Now take sufficiency. Suppose the unfair price A offers does not
leave B at A's mercy—in short, the offer does not dominate B. Then, the offer is not exploitative.
The advantage of the domination view over the original vulnerability view is that the former is more discriminat-
ing than the latter. That is, the instrumentalization of vulnerability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for dom-
ination: This is why surgeons and gardeners do not necessarily exploit patients and patio owners, respectively. What
makes, or breaks, the case for exploitation is whether the relationship between A and B enunciates a kind of subor-
dination, that is, involves A treating B as her servant and, in so doing, promotes her own interests. Whether such
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over B. Consider: successful doctors, teachers, and parents have power over patients, students, and children, respec-
tively. But being a successful doctor, teacher, or parent partly consists in helping patients, students, and children act
for reasons independent of that power (that is, for health, knowledge, and flourishing, respectively). On the other
hand, when A gets B to act for reasons that are not independent of her power over B, A dominates B. This is what
pimps, bullies, and bosses normally do. Exploitation is the dividend they extract from the servitude of others.
I now try to vindicate the domination view (6.2) against the most promising alternative, the distributive view (5.4).
On the distributive view, A exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B, where the unfairness baseline is
decided by background distribution. Now consider
Ant and Grasshopper—Ant works hard all summer and has ample provisions for the winter. Grasshopper lazes
about and in January has an empty cupboard. Without interaction, Grasshopper will end up with welfare level two,
which amounts to dire misery, and Ant with three, bare sufficiency, and in this scenario, Ant is comparatively more
deserving; the gap between the welfare level Ant has and what he deserves is far greater for him than is the compa-
rable gap for Grasshopper. Ant proposes to sell some provisions to Grasshopper at a very high price. Grasshopper
accepts the deal, though he would prefer to pay less and get more. With this deal in place, Grasshopper ends up with
welfare level three and Ant with 12. Even after this transaction, Ant's welfare level is less than he deserves, by com-
parison with the situation of Grasshopper.
Contrast Ant and Grasshopper with the original Pit case. If the latter case involves exploitation, then so does the
former. Suppose that by failing to accumulate provisions, Grasshopper finds herself incapable of fighting soil erosion.
This lands her at the bottom of a pit. Ant walks up to her to offer work for $1/day for the rest of Grasshopper's life.
Ant's behavior in this context is no different from A's Pit behavior: Both prey on the weak for self‐enrichment, when
both have the option of costlessly helping without preying. Ant therefore exploits Grasshopper. This conclusion con-
tradicts the distribution view.
On the distribution view, moreover, “unfair treatment” and “exploitation” are used interchangeably. Saying that A
exploits B has no extra conceptual purchase. The distribution view therefore trivializes the concept of exploitation. On
the domination view, by contrast, exploitation is about relations of power and servitude. The critique of such relations
is not assimilable, without remainder, to the critique of distribution.
Wertheimer (1987) develops a similar, indirect, argumentative strategy in defense of the domination view. In
discussion of coercion and the law of contracts, Wertheimer criticizes views that assimilate complaints of
“advantage‐taking” under distributive justice. His main concern in this context is to distinguish between claims
of coercion, on one hand, and claims of unfairness, on the other. The former set of claims, he argues, are
founded on a certain conception of rights. Claims of exploitation, on the other hand, are not necessarily
coextensive with a violation of rights. He proceeds to distinguish between different forms of “advantage‐taking.”
A corollary of that distinction is that exploitation is compatible with the absence of distributive injustice. That is,
Wertheimer claims that the theory of distributive justice is exclusively concerned with “fairness in result.” But
advantage‐taking is not just about “(result‐oriented) considerations of distributive justice.” So the “best theory”
of advantage‐taking, coercive or exploitative, cannot be distributive. That theory depends, rather, on the distri-
bution‐independent nature of the power relation between potential transactors. And that is the domain of the
domination account.7 | FURTHER READING
The two most comprehensive philosophical treatments of the concept of exploitation are Wertheimer (1996) and
Sample (2003). For an overview of recent literature, see Wertheimer and Zwolinski (2012).
Teleological accounts. Buchanan (1984) defends the harm view of exploitation. Van Donselaar (2009) defends a
mutual‐advantage account.
12 of 14 VROUSALISRespect accounts. Sample (2003) defends the mere‐means account. Steiner (1984) defends a rights‐based view.
Holmstrom (1977), Peffer (1990), and Reiman (1987) defend variants of the forced nonreciprocation view. Nearly
all analytical Marxists, including Cohen (1995) and Roemer (1982, 1996), in addition to non‐Marxists, such as Arneson
(1994, Arneson, 2016) and Valdman, 2009 defend the distributive injustice view.
Freedom accounts. Goodin, 1987, 1985 andWood (1995) defend variants of the vulnerability view. Snyder (2008)
discusses the connection between exploitation and needs. A variant of the domination view receives important expo-
sition in Wood (1972) and, more recently, in Wood (2014). Vrousalis (2013, 2016) defends the domination view.
Exploitation theory has recently received interesting treatments in applied ethics. Risse and Wollner (2013) apply
exploitation concepts to international trade agreements and trade justice. Wertheimer (2011) and Wenner (2015)
discuss exploitation in clinical research. Mayer (2005) and Attas (2000) discuss guest workers. Zwolinski (2007) and
Mayer (2007) discuss sweatshops. Shelby (2002) discusses prostitution. Brewer (1990) and De‐Shalit (1998) are
accessible introductions to the connections between exploitation and imperialism, on the one hand, and global justice,
on the other. Greasley (2014) offers a cogent summary of the debate on exploitation in commercial organ donation.
Structural exploitation is discussed in Zwolinski (2012) and Young (2011). On the connections between exploitation
and race, see Mills (2017). On exploitation and gender, see McKeown (2016) and Young (1990).
ENDNOTES
1 Due to space limitations, the paper only addresses the grounds of exploitation, as opposed to its forms (interpersonal,
structural, economic, intersectional, etc.)
2 See Wertheimer (1996, pp. 209–210) for discussion. Wertheimer also discusses a salient distinction between ex ante and
ex post benefit.
3 For discussion of this distinction, see Goodin (1987) and Wood (1995).
4 Buchanan (1985) defends necessity.
5 Feinberg's inference is cogently criticized in Wertheimer (1996, chapter 9).
6 This conclusion is cogently defended by Feinberg (1988) and Wood (1995).
7 The original discussion of UE is Roemer (1982). See Veneziani and Yoshihara (2016) for a recent axiomatic treatment.
8 This assumption leads to a central problem in Marxist economic theory that of translating labor values into prices. This is
sometimes called the transformation problem (see Cohen, 1988 and Roemer, 1982 for discussion). The unequal exchange
definitions were invented precisely to circumvent this problem, without affecting the crux of Marx's theory.
9 See Marx (1992, chapter 18) for discussion.
10 For vindication of these doubts, see Arneson (1981) and Geras (1992).
11 “Freely”: not by dint of domination, coercion, or force. The mere necessity of this qualification shows that the attribution
to Marx of a “technical” account of exploitation as naked unequal exchange is absurd.
12 Note that A and B can stand for classes, instead of individuals. Moreover, “consuming” labor here refers to the consump-
tion bundle the agent consumes, given her wage and price level.
13 See Anderson (1974) for a historical overview.
14 For comprehensive treatment of the distinction between the form and the mode of exploitation, see Cohen (1978, chapter
3).
15 Note that, unlike the rich able‐bodied in (5.1b), the poor able‐bodied in (5.1d) are not coerced. It is therefore easier to
object to (5.1b) than to (5.1d).
16 This situation raises the question of moral hazard: If A is obliged to rescue B, for anti‐exploitation reasons, then B has no
incentive to work in the summer. The question is addressed by Ferguson (2016).
17 For a wealth of similar examples against this interpretation of Wertheimer, see Sample (2003). In Section 6, I will argue that
there is another, freedom‐based reading of Wertheimer.
18 Note that “factor of production” is a loaded term, for it supposes that capital is productive.
19 This argument is reminiscent of the idea mocked by Marx (1992, pp. 738–46), to the effect that profit is a reward for absti-
nence. In a similar vein, Alfred Marshall (1890) mentions, in passing, Baron Rothschild's “reward for waiting.”
20 But see Cohen, 1995, chapter 8, for a rebuttal.
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